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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BILL S. WOODY d.b.a. 
'VOODY DRILLING CO., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BERT RHODES and 
VAUGHN RHODES, 
Defendant and Respondent. 




STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
In this action a Nevada well-driller sued two 
brothers upon a promissory note and an alleged oral 
contract and for attorneys fees, and obtained a default 
judgment against one brother, which judgment was set 
aside because there was no valid service of a summons 
u1rnn the defendant. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
The lower court granted the motion of defendant 
Vaughn Rhodes, to set aside and vacate the default 
judgment for the reason that there was no valid service 
of summons upon him. However, the court did not dis-
miss the complaint of plaintiff, but, instead, granted 
plaintiff an extension of time in which to answer the 
counterclaim of the defendant, Vaughn Rhodes, so that 
matter could be set for a trial on its merits. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent Vaughn Rhodes seeks to 
haYe the appellate court affirm the lower court in its 
decision to set aside and vacate the default judgment. 
However, the defendant-respondent Vaughn Rhodes 
agrees with and consents to appellant's request that the 
matter be remanded to the lower court so that it may 
be heard upon its merits inasmuch as the matter has 
never been dismissed by the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed suit in February, 1967, in the First 
District Court in Box Elder County, Utah, against the 
two defendants claiming that he was entitled to 
$4,000.00 upon a promissory note, $1500.00 upon an 
alleged oral contract and $800.00 for attorney's fees 
(R.15). In attempting service upon the defendants a 
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member of the Box Elder County Sheriff's Department 
served a copy of the complaint and a summons at the 
home of the defendant Vaughn Rhodes, in Tremonton, 
Elder County, State of Utah, by leaving a copy 
of the complaint and summons with the wife of Vaughn 
Rhodes. (R.18, Defendant's Ex. 3). 
The deputy sheriff wrote upon the copy of the 
summons left at the home that he: 
"served this summons and complaint on the with-
in named defendant Bert Rhodes on the 20 day 
of February, 1968, at Trementon, Box Elde
0
r 
County, Utah." (Defendant's Ex. No. 3). 
However, upon the sheriff's Return of the Summons, 
deposited with the court, the deputy wrote that he had 
served said summons: 
"upon the therein named Vaughn Rhodes" (R. 
18). 
No other service was ever made upon either of the named 
defendants (R.24). 
\Vhen Vaughn Rhodes later returned to his home 
in Tremonton, his wife showed him the summons and 
stated that it was for his brother, as indicated by the 
writing of the deputy sheriff (R.24). Vaughn Rhodes 
had never before received a summons, and believed what 
he read. Bert Rhodes is not a resident of the State of 
Ctah but rather is a resident of Nevada (R.19,21,24) 
hut happened to be in Tremonton on that day because 
of the funeral of a family member (R.24). He took the 
summons and complaint with him back to Nevada where 
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he contacted an attorney who advised him that inas-
much as he was not a Utah resident he need not be con-
cerned about the matter. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. I, 
R.24). However, the Nevada attorney, James L. Wads-
worth, wrote a letter to counsel for plaintiff in Logan, 
Utah, in an attempt to explain the erroneous service, 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. l) but in the letter he, like 
the deputy, erroneously reversed the names of the two 
brothers, Bert and Vaughn, and indicated that Vaughn 
\vas the Nevada resident and Bert was the Utah resi-
dent. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. I) . Then plaintiff be-
came the third party to reverse the brothers names when 
he prayed for a default to be entered against Bert 
Rhodes, who is and was a Nevada resident. (R.19,20). 
In his Precipe and Default plaintiff requested that the 1 
action against the defendant Vaughn Rhodes be dis-
missed, wrongly stating that he resided in Nevada ( R. 
19). The names of the two brothers were later switchell 
on the court records in five different places to release 
Bert Rhodes and to allow plaintiff to obtain his default 
judgment against the defendant Vaughn Rhodes. ( R. 1 
19,20). On April 2, 1968, the judgment by default 
was entered against Vaughn Rhodes, for approximately , 
$7,000.00, (R.21) but no notice of the judgment was 
ever brought to his attention (R. 25). 
During the last few days of January, an abstracter 
discovered the default judgment against the name of 
the def en<lant Vaughn Rhodes and brought it to his 
attention (R.25). Vaughn Rhodes immediately con-
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tacted an attorney and requested him to attempt to re-
move the default judgment. But when no motion had 
been filed at the end of two months he contacted a new 
attorney to represent him. A motion to set aside and 
vacate the default judgment was filed in his behalf on 
April 29, 1969, within three months from the date he 
received notice of the judgment. (R. 25,27). Defendant 
Vaughn Rhodes also filed an Affidavit in Support of 
Motion and an Answer and Counterclaim to the com-
plaint of the plaintiff on that date. (R.22,31). 
On May 13, 1969, a hearing was held before the 
Box Elder County Court on the motion (R.33). In 
presenting his grounds for his motion, defendant 
Y aughn Rhodes attempted to show the judgment was 
mid when taken because of lack of jurisdiction, and 
other grounds, as set out in his affidavit. However, 
the court restricted its inquiry to the single issue of 
whether or not the defendant had received valid service 
(TR.1-14). At the conclusion of the hearing the court 
stated it intended to set aside the judgment but allowed 
the parties to file briefs in support of their positions 
( TR.12). On June 17, 1969, the court entered its Find-
ings of Fact and Order setting aside and vacating the 
default judgment on the ground that the defendant 
did not receive the required legal notice by summons. 
(R.33) On June 24, 1969, the court issued a further 
order granting plaintiff an extension of time to July 
21, 1969, in which to answer the counterclaim of the 
defendant, Vaughn Rhodes, but did not dismiss the ac-
5 




THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERil 
r 
IN SETTING ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDG-
)IENT UPON THE GROUND THAT THE DE-
FENDANT, VAUGHN RHODES, DID NO'l' 
RECEIVE VALID SERVICE OF A SUMMONS. 
In its order of June 17, 1969, the District Court 
stated in its Findings of Fact and Order: 
"That the deputy sheriff in attempting to serve 
a copy of the summons upon the defendant peti-
tioner did erroneously write the wrong defend-
ant's name upon the summons left at the peti-
tioner's home and failed to provide this petitioner , 
and defendant with the notice required under 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (R.33) 
The law has long been settled in Utah that where 
there is no valid service of a summons upon a defendant, 
a default judgement is void. See State Tax Commis-
sion vs. Larsen, 100 Utah 699, llO P2d 558. And, the 
requirements for a valid service of a summons have been 
well defined by the courts. In National Farmers Union 
Property and Casualty Co. vs. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 
286 P2d 249 ( 1956) this court expressed the frequently 
quoted guide-line: 
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"Notwithstanding all of our efforts to elimi-
nate technicalities and liberalize procedure, we 
must not lose sight of the cardinal principle that 
under our system of justice, if an issue is to be 
tried and a party's rights concluded with respect 
thereto, he must have notice thereof and an op-
portunity to meet it." (p.13). 
That and other decisions of the Utah Supreme 
Court have clearly determined that the essential re-
quirement of service is that it must provide a party with 
such notice as to alert him to the fact that he must re-
spond or waive his rights. The service in this matter diJ 
not meet that exacting standard, where the notation 0£ 
the deputy on the summons expressly stated that he 
had served Bert Rhodes, yet he later informed the court 
in his affidavit that he had served Vaughn Rhodes. 
The California Supreme Court, in the case of Peter-
sen v. Vane, 57 C.A.2d 58, 134 P2d 6, strongly ex-
pressed its view that such service does not meet the re-
quirements of the law. There a defendant who was 
served as a "fictitious" defendant, appealed from a de-
fault judgment. The court there stated: 
"Of course, if the process server fraudulently 
misleads the person served by telling him that 
the summons is for someone else, equity may pos-
sess the power to set aside a judgment based on 
such service." 
'!\Thile in our case there is no evidence that the 
deputy's misleading statement was intentional, the effect 
is just as harsh and deprived the defendant of his day 
in court, the same as if the process server had acted 
fraudulently. 7 
In the recent Utah case of Rees vs. Scott, 8 Utah 
2d 134, 328 P2d 877, a situation strikingly similar to 
ours arose. There a deputy sheriff in serving the defend-
ant fail::d to write the date of service on the copy of the 
summons left with the defendant, but did write the date 
of service upon the copy returned to the court. \ Vhen 
that service was challenged the Utah Supreme Court 
wisely held that the summons was insufficient and that 
the defect could not be disregarded as a mere irregulari- ' 
ty under Rule 61. \Vhen the plaintiff appealed to the 
eourt that the omission was inconsequential the court 
stated, concerning Rule 61: 
"The above rule is salutary where applicable. 
But it cannot be used as a catch-all to cover up 1 
defects, errors, or omissions upon which the rights 
and duties of adverse parties depend." (p.135) 
It would be difficult indeed to find a fact situation 
more closely in line with the facts of this case or to 
find a circumstance where the rights of a party are more 
dependent upon the requirements of fair notice. 
In the earlier Utah case of Columbia Trust Com-
pany vs. Steiner, 71 Utah 498, 267 P 788, the Supreme 
Court insisted that the technical requirements in serving 
a defendant must be strictly complied with. There ;i 
defendant was served, as in our case, by a copy of the 
summons being left with the defendant's wife at his 
home. A default judgment entered against him mis 
appealed on the ground that the summons was not valid. 
The court ruled in his favor and concluded that the 
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affidavit and proof of service were defective in three 
particulars: That the affidavit failed to show that the 
person making the service was of qualified age on the 
<late of service, even though it showed he was on the 
date when he made proof of service; that the affidavit 
failed to show the summons which was served at de-
fendant's home was delivered to his "usual place of 
abode"; and third, that the affidavit did not state that 
the wife of the defendant was over 14 years of age even 
though she was a married woman. The obvious intent 
of the court was to require a full compliance with the 
rnks and to allow the parties their day in court. 
In an often cited California case, City of Los An-
r;eles vs. Morgan, 105 C.A. 2d 726, 234 P2d 319, where 
it was determined that an affidavit of service was 
fraudulent, the court stated: 
"Under the due process clause of the federal 
constitution a personal judgment rendered with-
out service of process on, or legal notice to, a 
defendant is not merely voidable, but yoid, in 
the absence of a voluntary appearance or waiver." 
(p.321) 
court then quoted an earlier California decision, 
holding: 
"It has long been established that a false affi-
davit of service constitutes extrinsic fraud. A 
nartv is thus prevented from having his day in 
C:Trl· ,1; will :·ck,.,-· a rarty from 
an w; just judgment rendered against him when, 
witl o; 1t service of process, either actual or con-
9 
structive, no opportunity has been given him to 
be heard in his defense." (p.322). 
The failure of proper _service in our case denied the 
defendant Vaughn Rhodes an opportunity to be heard. 
For that reason the court properly set aside the default 
judgment. 
In the recent Utah case of Utah Sand and Gravel 
Products Corp. vs. Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P2d 
703 ( 1964) the defendant appealed a lower court's re-
fusal to set aside a default judgment entered following 
service of a summons which was obviously invalid in 
its face. The Supreme Court .unanimously reversed the 
lower court and set aside the judgment. There Justice 
Crockett, writing for the court, stated: 
"It is true that our new rules of civil procedure 
were intended to eliminate undue emphasis on 
technicalities and to provide liberality in proce-
dure to the end that disputes be heard and deter-
mined on their merits . . . Liberality in their 
interpretation and application should be indulged 
where no prejudice or disadvantage to anyone 
results, but where failure to comply with the rules 
will result in some substantial prejudice or dis-
advantage to a party, they should be adhered to 
with fidelity. 
The proper issuance and ser't)ice of a summons 
which is the means of invoking the jurisdiction 
uf the court and of acquiring jurisdiction o·ocr 
the defendant, is the foundation of a lawsuit . .. " 
(emphasis added) ( p.409) 
10 
The court concluded with a strong expression that 
whenever possible the merits of a case should be deter-
mined. 
"Another point raised by the defendant de-
serves comment. Even if the defect in the sum-
mons had been some mere irregularity which 
could be cured by amendment, it would be diffi-
cult indeed to understand the trial court's failure 
to set aside the default judgment. It is in ac-
cordance with our rules, and our decisional law, 
that where a default has been taken against a 
party and there is any justifiable excuse, the 
court should be indulgent in setting aside the 
judgment to afford him an opportunity for a 
trial on merits, and any doubt about such a mat-
ter should be resolved in favor of doing so ... " 
(p.410) 
The court there reemphasized its attitude expressed in 
Taylor vs. E. M. Royle Corp.) 1 Utah 2d 175, 264 P2d 
279, where it said: 
"It is true that our new rules should be 'liber-
ally construed' to secure a 'just ... determination 
of every action, but they do not represent a one-
way street down which but one litigant may 
travel .. .' 
"Be that as it may, a defendant must be ex-
tended every reasonable opportunity to prepare 
his case and to meet an adversary's claims. Also 
he must be protected against surprise and be 
assured equal opportunity and facility to present 
and prove counter contentions - else unilateral 
justice and injustice would result sufficient to 
serious doubts as to constitutional due pro-
cess guarantees." 
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Based upon all of the foregoing authorities it is 
clear that the lower court followed excellent legal prece-
dent when it set aside the judgment based upon an 
invalid service. 
However, appellant contends that the court was 
limited by Rule 60 (b) ( 4) to a three month period 
following the entry of the judgment in which to set it 
aside, and could not apply Rule 60 (b) (7) and enforce 
equity. Appellant contends that the subsections are 
exc]usive, but that view is clearly contrary 
to the law. Rule 60 (b) ( 7) reads: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the f urtherauce of justice re-
lieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order or proceeding for the fol-
lowing reasons: . . . ( 7) any other reason j usti-
f ying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
" 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressly defilled 
the scope of Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) on several occasions. l n 
the 1956 case of Ney vs. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 
P2d 1114, a default judgment was set aside 11 month-; 
after its entry on the ground that a mistake had 
occurred. The court explained: 
"Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure lists the instances in which a court may, 
in the furtherance of justice, open a judgment 
obtained by default. Six specific categories are 
set forth: . . . In addition, subsection ( 7) per-
mits the judgment to be opened for 'any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of 
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the judgment.' Relief upon the first four 
grounds must be sought within three months 
from entry of the judgment; and upon the others' 
within a reasonable time.' Defendant Alda did 
not request relief until nearly 11 months had 
elapsed, and hence the only applicable section of 
Rule 60 ( b) upon which she could rely was ( 7) . " 
(p.218) 
The court then explained that the appellant's basis 
for her motion was mistake, which is expressly provided 
for in subsection (I). Then, answering an argument 
very similar to appellant's in our case, the court said: 
"Plaintiff urges that this type of mistake is 
a mistake of law and not within the purview of 
Rule 60 (b), and argues that if relief be justified 
in this type of case, it will destroy the firmly 
established policy that judgments should be 
final so that confidence can be reposed in this. 
Plaintiff points out that Rule 60 (b) is in deroga-
tion of the common law rule that all judgments 
become final after the close of the term, and 
places reliance on the rule that statutes in deroga-
tion of the common law must be strictlv con-
strued. 'Ve are aware of such a rule but· it has 
no application in the law of this state. 
"Our civil code expressly provides: 
'The rule of the common law that 
statutes in derogation thereof are to be 
strictly construed has no application to 
the of this state ... ' 
"The statutory authority of a trial court to set 
aside judgments obtained by default has been 
liberally construed to the end that there be trial 
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o!l the merits, beginning with our earliest deci-
SIOnS ... 
" 'The allowance of a vacation of judgment is 
a creature of equity designed to relieve against 
harshness of enforcing a judgment, whicl1 may 
occur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs 
of the opposing party, or misfortunes which pre-
vent the presentation of a claim or defense .. .' 
"The trial court could well regard this as 
among the class of cases that Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) was 
intended to govern ... 
"The Utah decisions relied upon by plaintiff 
recognize the firmly established principle that it 
is largely within the discretion of the trial court 
whether a default should be relieved, which dis-
cretion will not be disturbed unless there is a 
patent abuse thereof." (emphasis added.) 
An even more recent interpretation of the applica-
tio:i of 60(b) (7) is found in Board of Education of 
Granite School vs. Cox, 16 Utah 2d 20, 39J 
P2d 55 ( 1964). 'Vhere a default judgment was entered 
against a husband and wife, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower court's decision to set aside the default 
judgment in favor of the wife where the husband and 
wife were jointly sued but only the husband was served. 
Justice Callister, writing for the court, there explained 
that the District Court was empowered to set aside the 
judgment against the wife by virtue of authority 
granted it in Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) , and affirmed the trial 
court. 
Ptah's Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned upon 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Rule 
14 
60(b) subsection (6) is identical to Utah's Rule 60(b) 
subsection ( 7). In the authoritative treatise by Barron 
and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Wright 
Revision ( 1958), Volume 3, p. 420, this very problem is 
commented upon: 
"The most difficult question with regard to 
Rule 60 ( b) ( 6) is whether relief can be had 
thereunder for reasons which are mentioned in 
the first five clauses of Rule 60 (b), or whether 
the reference to 'other reason' makes this clause 
and the first five mutually exclusive. The ques-
tion is important because of time limitations on 
moving for relief ... " 
The writers then recite the history of the Rule and fully 
answer the question they pose by listing numerous 
cases where subsection ( 6) has been held to include 
relief also available under the first five subsections, had 
the motion been made within the statutory time limit. 
The authors then conclude: 
"[This judicial interpretation] is striking evi-
dence of what a flexible device for avoiding the 
time limits of Rule 60 ( b) clause ( 6) provides to 
a strong court. 
"Thus cases of extreme hardship or injustice 
may be brought within a more liberal dispensa-
tion than a literal reading of rule would 
allow. And indeed, there is little reason why a 
motion or application for relief from a judgment 
should not be considered in the same broad per-
si;ectiYe as an independent action to vacate or 
s;t aside the judgment." (emphasis added) (p. 
42l)) 
15 
Obviously the Federal interpretation of the scope 
the rule is identical with that of the Utah Supreme 
Court. Both allow equity in this kind of case. 
Finally, appellant claims defendant had notice of 
the entry of the default. In his brief on page 2 he 
claims that he mailed a copy of the judgment to Attor-
ney \Vadsworth in Nevada. At the hearing he intro-
duced as an exhibit (Plaintiff's Ex. No. 2) a copy of 
the letter he claimed to have mailed ( TR.8). Howeyer, 
that exhibit is clearly dated April 9, 1969, a full year 
after the alleged mailing. Further, Attorney 'Vads-
has sworn in an affidavit that he never received 
;my communication from plaintiff or his counsel at any 
time. 
From all the foregoing authorities it is clear that 
the district court followed established precedent and 
correctly set aside and vacated the default judgment 
entered following an invalid service of summons, and 
acted pursuant to authority granted it in the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT DIS-
.MISS THE ACTION BY THE PLAINTIFF 
AT ANY TIME. 
On June 24, 1969, Dne week following the order 
of June 17, 1969, vacating the default judgment ap-
pealed from, the lower court entered a second order, 
granting the plaintiff-appellant additional time in 
16 
which to answer the counterclaim of this defendant. 
Thal order is the final order of the court, and was en-
tered nine days prior to plaintiff-appellant's appeal on 
July 3, 1969. The order of June 24, 1969, reads (R.35) : 
"Upon the request of Ted S. Perry, Esquire, 
counsel for plaintiff, for additional time in which 
to answer the counterclaim in this action, plaintiff 
hereby is granted an extension of time until July 
21, 1969, in which to answer the counterclaim of 
the defendant Vaughn Rhodes for the reason 
that the counsel for plaintiff has indicated to 
the court that it may be necessary for him to 
withdraw as counsel for the plaintiff, necessi-
tating the employment of new counsel by plain-
tiff; and notice is hereby given that unless the 
plaintiff files some additional pleadings or mo-
tions to show he is diligently prosecuting this 
action before July 21, 1969, his complaint may 
be dismissed without prejudice." 
The order is obviously an attempt to prompt the parties 
to file the necessary pleadings so that the matter could 
be set for trial upon its merits. The determination of 
the court to move the matter forward timely is further 
e''idenced by its statement that: 
" ... unless the plaintiff files some additional 
pleadings or motions to show he is diligently 
prosecuting this action before July 21, 1969, his 
complaint may be dismissed without prejudice." 
The court was attempting to prevent the foreseeable 
problems of the defendant obtaining a default judgment 
on his counterclaim against the plaintiff which would 
further complicate matters. A motion for def a ult was 
17 
anticipated by the court since 57 days had then passed 
since the counterclaim was filed. By the court's order 
the pJaintiff was granted a total of 83 days in which to 
answer the counterclaim instead of the normal period 
of 20 days. It is evident that the appeal upon this point 
is not well taken and should be immediately dismissed ' 
by this court. Plaintiff's counsel was mailed two copies 
of the court's order (R.35,42), neither of which ""ere 
returned undelivered, so plaintiff was certainly aware 
of it. 
Respondent, Vaughn Rhodes, is eager to have the 
matter set for trial so that the issues may be determined 
upon their merits. In his original Motion to set aside 
the judgment (R.27) and in his Affidavit in Support 
of }lotion ( R.26) he expressly requested a trial 
as he did in his Answer and Counterclaim ( R.28) . 
For all of the foregoing reasons, responde11 t 
Y aughn Rhodes respectfully urges the court to affirm 
the judgment of the lower court in vacating and setting 
aside the judgment, and to remand the matter for n 
tria] upon its merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD F. GORDON 
Mann and Hadfield 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Vaughn Rhodes 
..i:\l.torney for Respondent 
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